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Stare Decisis in the F.E.L.A.
Harry G. Fuerst*
J UDICIALLY SPEAKING, uniformity is stare decisis. The law leans
towards the approval and application of the doctrine.'
The advocate in a given cause must determine what, if any,
are the changes in the law affecting his case. Thereby he may
take advantage of metamorphosis, as well as of any additional
or unique evidence in his case that must compel a different
or new conclusion, and thus force the judge to depart from
stare decisis.
The operation of the doctrine of stare decisis has been de-
scribed as follows:
Under doctrine a deliberate or a solemn decision of
court made after argument on question of law fairly arising
in a case, and necessary to its determination, is an authority,
or binding precedent in the same court, or in other courts of
equal or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very
point is again in controversy. 2
Wherein can the advocate find aid in solving the problem
of stare decisis et non quieta movere? 3
The general doctrine on stare decisis is that when a court
has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
set of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases, where the facts are substantially the same.4 Thus,
the basic question here is: Do the facts in an advocate's case
compare substantially to the precedent or stare decisis he is con-
fronted with?
*Of Miami Beach, Florida; member of the Bar of Illinois and Ohio.
' This study is especially directed to the subject of torts and the provisions
as to the rights of railroad interstate employees governed by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. Secs. 51-60 (1958), the Federal Safety
Appliance Acts, 45 U. S. C. Secs. 1-16 (1958), and the Federal Boiler In-
spection Acts, 45 U. S. C. Secs. 22-34 (1958).
2 Black, Law Dictionary 1577 (4th ed. 1951). The Latin translation of stare
decisis is, "To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." Also defined as, "Policy
of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point."
3 "To adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established."
Black, Law Dictionary, op. cit. supra note 2 at 1578.
4 Black, Law Dictionary, op. cit. supra note 2 at 1577.
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A. Was the F. E. L. A. Statute Changed or Amended in the
Interim?
Congress on August 11, 1939, amended the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, 5 and by the sweep of the President's pen
the old and archaic defense of assumption of risk was com-
pletely eliminated from the Act. As Justice Black announced in
the case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,6 the doctrine of
assumption of risk is as dead as a dodo bird.
The applicability of the Act prior to August 11, 1939, was
determined by the principle announced and stated in Illinois
Cent. R. R. v. Behrens,7 in which the Court said: "by its terms
the true test is the nature of the work being done at the time
of the injury.""
This narrow interpretation and construction of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act resulted in two evils. First: It produced
the question: Was the relation of master and servant at the time
of the injury in interstate commerce?
Second, in many cases the employee was deprived of his
remedy because, while working on both interstate and intrastate
shipments indiscriminately, he could not prove the exact nature
of the movement in which he was engaged at the very instant
of an injury, and the evidence by which he might attempt to
prove this vital fact was in the hands and under the control of
the defendant railroad. By the 1939 amendment, this test was
abolished.9
The benefits of the amendatory act are now, by its terms, ex-
tended to an employee
. . . any part of whose duties shall be the furtherance of
interstate and foreign commerce; or shall, in any way di-
rectly or closely and substantially affect such commerce. 10
Following the adoption of the F. E. L. A. amendment, in
Lavender v. Kurn," the Supreme Court startled the entire Bar
by permitting an advocate to speculate a theory from the evi-
5 See note 1 supra.
6 318 U. S. 54 (1943).
7 233 U. S. 473 (1914).
8 Id. at 478.
9 53 Stat. 1404 (1939).
10 Ibid.
11 327 U. S. 645 (1946).
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dence by which the jury could find that the decedent's death
was negligently caused by the railroad. 12
A most important decision was reached in the case of Gal-
lick v. Baltimore & 0. R. R.13 The action was predicated upon
an insect bite. The cause was tried in the Court of Common
Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Judgment for the plaintiff was
appealed and the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, rendering
final judgment for the railroad. 14 The Supreme Court of Ohio
dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, holding that no debatable con-
stitutional question was involved. 15 After granting the writ of
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court found that the evi-
dence present was sufficient to raise an issue for the jury's de-
termination as to whether the insect emanated from the pool.1
The Supreme Court stated, referring to the case of Tennant
v. Peoria & P. U. Ry.: 17
The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of
the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury.
It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body...
The very essence of its function is to select from among con-
flicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers
most reasonable .... (321 U. S., at 35)18
Again citing precedents, the Supreme Court further stated:
These cases, as does the instant case, all involved the
question of whether there was evidence that any employer
negligence caused the harm, or more precisely, enough to
justify a jury's determination that employer negligence had
played any role in producing the harm. 19
When there is such evidence, "it is error to refuse to accept
jury's verdict against railroad in a suit under the Employers' Li-
ability Act." 20
12 See, Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry., 321 U. S. 29, 35 (1944); Bailey v.
Central Vermont R.R., 319 U. S. 350, 353, 354 (1943); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 318 U. S. 54, 67, 68 (1943). See also Moore, Recent Trends in
Judicial Interpretation in Railroad Cases Under the Federal Employers' Li-
ability Act. 29 Marq. L. Rev. 73 (1946).
13 372 U. S. 108 (1963).
'4 173 N. E. 2d 382 (Ohio St. App. 1961).
15 172 Ohio St. 488, 178 N. E. 2d 597 (1961).
16 Supra note 13.
17 321 U. S. 29 (1944).
18 Supra note 13.
19 Id.
20 83 Sup. Ct. 659, 660.
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Concerning the reasonable foreseeability of harm, the Court
says:
. . . Reasonable foreseeability is an essential ingredient
of Federal Employers' Liability Act negligence, . . . but this
requirement has been satisfied in the present case by the
jury's findings . . . of negligence in maintaining the filthy
pool of water. 1
It was on the question of foreseeability that the Ohio Appellate
Court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff. Uniformly, the courts
have denied the defense of the doctrine of foreseeability where
a defendant was guilty of negligence per se.
The Supreme Court of the United States disposes of the con-
tention advanced by the Ohio court with the following language:
• . .We have no doubt that under a statute where the tort-
feasor is liable for death or injuries caused even "in slightest
part" . . . by his negligence, such a tortfeasor must com-
pensate his victim for even the improbable or unexpectedly
severe consequences of his wrongful act.
22
B. Has the Federal Employers' Liability Act Been Changed to
Affect Any of the Decisions Under the Federal Safety Ap-
pliance Acts?
The Supreme Court, in interpreting actions arising solely
under the Safety Appliance Act 23 and prior to the F. E. L. A.
amendment of August 11, 1939, had determined that a claim
predicated solely upon a Safety Appliance Act did not of itself
give rise to a cause of action. In Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley
Ry.,24 the Court denied recovery for a violation of a Safety Ap-
pliance Act, as the injury was incurred during intrastate work.
The amendment has done away with such distinction of intrastate
and interstate work.
C. What Benefits Were Created for Railroad Employees Affect-
ing Prior Decisions Under the Federal Boiler Inspection Acts
by the Amendment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of
August 11, 1939?
It must be remembered that neither the Safety Appliance
Acts, the Boiler Inspection Act,25 nor any of their amendments
21 Supra note 13.
22 Id.
23 Supra note 1.
24 292 U. S. 57 (1934).
25 Supra note 1.
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give rise to a cause of action. Thus, it is essential to establish a
right to sue by joining the Federal Employers' Liability Act to-
gether with its amendments with the Safety Appliance Acts
and/or Boiler Inspection Act.
In observing the benefits derived from the coupling of the
Federal Boiler Inspection Act with the Federal Employers' Li-
ability Act, the Supreme Court in Urie v. Thompson,26 an action
to recover damages for silicosis, agreed that the rule of the
I. C. C. was intended merely to afford additional braking power
which under the conventional tort doctrine would not impose
absolute liability. The Supreme Court held that the Boiler In-
spection Act itself, irrespective of the rule, provided the rights of
recovery.2 7
Here again, the United States Supreme Court called atten-
tion to the fact that the Boiler Inspection Act, although not
intended as protection against silicosis, when coupled with the
F. E. L. A. provides recovery for railroad employees who are
injured through use of an unsafe locomotive. No back-shop em-
ployee, or employee of a plant engaged in making repairs, re-
building, or constructing cars or equipment and parts thereof
prior to the F. E. L. A. amendment of August 11, 1939, could
ever maintain a cause of action against an interstate railroad
carrier under the same set of facts.28 How could any employee
establish interstate commerce when the Behrens case 29 was the
controlling provision as to his rights of recovery, i.e., the work
he was engaged in at the time of the accident was not in inter-
state commerce?
Again, in the case of Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R. R.30
the Supreme Court held:
The Act, . . . is to be liberally construed .... Any employee
engaged in interstate commerce who is injured by reason of
26 337 U. S. 163 (1949).
27 Id. n. 34.
28 The following cases have now determined that it is immaterial whether
or not a member of a switching crew, or a car repairer, employed in a back
shop or in construction work is engaged in work then used in or designated
for interstate commerce. The only requirement needed to bring a case
within the amendment is that "any part" of this employee's duties, past,
present or future, be in furtherance of, or such as to affect commerce in any
way, directly or closely and substantially, Copley v. Industrial Acc. Comm.,
120 P. 2d 879 (Cal. Sup. 1942); Lewis v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 120 P. 2d
886 (Cal. Sup. 1942); Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 120 P. 2d
880 (Cal. Sup. 1942).
29 Supra note 7.
30 317 U. S. 481 (1943).
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a violation of the Act may bring his action under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act, charging the violation of the
Boiler Inspection Act.3 1
It is interesting to see how the Federal Boiler Inspection
Act, which is applicable to travelers in a crossing collision be-
tween an automobile and a freight train, enables injured plain-
tiffs to recover. The Act provides that it shall apply to rail-
road employees and highway travelers. The generic term "high-
way travelers" includes persons lawfully using vehicles on the
highways and their occupants or passengers.
A violation of the Federal Boiler Inspection Act may be
proved in two ways: First, by the inefficiency of the engine, its
parts and appurtenances; second, by proving a definite defect in
the engine, its parts and appurtenances. The braking equipment,
including the train's air brakes, are a part of the appurtenances
to an engine and also are covered separately in the Safety Ap-
pliance Acts. The duty of the railroad carrier as established by
the Boiler Inspection Act is absolute.3 2 Failure on the part of
the carrier to comply with safety provisions of the Boiler In-
spection Act deprives the carrier of any and all of the common
law defenses against the rights of employees and highway travel-
ers, thus creating an absolute right of recovery.
The advantages can readily be seen in the "crossing" case of
Fairport R. & E. R. R. v. Meredith.33 The claimants contended
that not the impact at the crossing was the cause of their in-
juries, but the failure to provide adequate and sufficient braking
equipment. The Court agreed that violation of the Federal Boiler
Inspection Act was the direct and proximate cause of the in-
juries.
Generally speaking, "crossing" cases in Ohio, and in a ma-
jority of the states without benefit of the Federal Boiler Inspec-
tion Act or any of the Safety Appliance Acts, usually have less
favorable results,34 since the decision in Baltimore & 0. R. R. v.
Goodman.35 The drivers in such cases appear guilty of con-
31 Id. at 486, 485.
32 Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 317 U. S. 481 (1943); Urie v. Thomp-
son, 337 U. S. 163 (1949)...
33 292 U. S. 589 (1934).
34 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Joseph, Same v. Winland, 112 F. 2d 518 (6th Cir.
1940); Patton v. Pennsylvania R.R., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N. E. 597 (1939);
Detroit, T. & I. R.R. v. Rohrs, 114 Ohio St. 493, 151 N. E. 714 (1926); Lang v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 134 Ohio St. 345, 18 N. E. 2d 271 (1938).
35 275 U. S. 66 (1927).
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tributory negligence. Under a more humane rule established in
Wisconsin, the jury decides the right of recovery in crossing
cases under a proper charge of comparative negligence. The doc-
trine of comparative negligence is not provided for under the
laws of Ohio. Advocates, if successful in establishing a viola-
tion of the Boiler Inspection Act or one of the Safety Appliance
Acts through investigation, may find the results more favorable
than in an ordinary crossing case. It therefore becomes vitally
important to determine whether in any crossing accident involv-
ing a carrier such a violation directly or proximately contributed
to the accident, because in this event the carrier is denied the
defense of contributory negligence.
D. Was There a Custom or Practice Existing at the Time the
Action Arose?
In the case of Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Robertson, 6 the em-
ployee, while guarding a bridge and trestle at night, was injured
through negligent operation of a train by the defendant carrier.
Despite the defense of assumption of risk, which was still ad-
missible then, a custom established by the defendant, was proved
whereby warning by several blasts of the whistle were to be
given. This was not done. The Court held that the failure to
comply with the custom and practice was substantial evidence
of the defendant's negligence.
The decision clearly indicated that the advocate in the prep-
aration for trial reaped the advantage of his investigation which
resulted in the proof of custom and practice.
E. Was There a Change in the Rules of Procedure or Pleading?
In the case of Warden v. H. E. Culbertson Co., the plaintiff
obtained a verdict in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and
thereafter the question of the statute of limitations arose in the
Supreme Court of Ohio.3 7 The defendants then filed a motion
for judgment non obstante veredicto on the ground that the
statute of limitations was properly raised by a general demurrer
originally filed in the lower court when the action was instituted,
and overruled by the trial court.38 The defendants' motion for
36 300 Fed. 314 (6th Cir.), cert. den., 266 U. S. 613 (1924).
37 H. E. Culbertson Co. v. Warden, 123 Ohio St. 297, 175 N. E. 205 (1931).
38 The statute of limitations in Ohio provided four years for the commence-
ment of an action when Warden's accident occurred. During the pendency
(Continued on next page)
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judgment was further based on Smith v. New York Cent. R. R.,3 1
in which the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled, in effect, that a gen-
eral demurrer properly raised the question of the statute of
limitations.
In Seymour v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry.,40 the Supreme
Court of Ohio still held that the general demurrer raised the
statute of limitations.
The Seymour case was the last pronouncement in which the
Ohio Supreme Court passed upon this question under the old
Revised Code section 5026. When the legislature later adopted
the Act of 1900, it added the new ground that the action was
not brought within the time limit for the commencement of such
actions. It was, therefore, the contention in the Warden case
that the general demurrer did not reach the question of the
statute of limitations in this cause, and that the only way to
raise the bar of the statute of limitations by demurrer was by
specifying and relying on added grounds.
F. Does the Contractual Relation of Master and Servant Differ
so that the Relation of Master and Servant Does Exist, as Dis-
tinguished from Other Cases?
In the case of Linstead v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 41 the United
States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and affirmed the verdict for plaintiff obtained in the
District Court, where an action had been filed under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act for the death of Linstead, whose wages
were paid by the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis
Railroad Company.
The accident happened on the Chesapeake & Ohio railroad
property while a Big Four crew, of which Linstead was a mem-
ber, was bringing a Chesapeake & Ohio train from Kentucky to
Riverside, Ohio. The Court said:
The work which was being done here by Linstead and his
crew was the work of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway....
We do not think that the fact that the Big Four road paid
(Continued from preceding page)
of the claim the Ohio Leglislature by amendment curtailed this right to
only two years. Warden's suit was instituted after the two-year period had
elapsed.
39 122 Ohio St. 45, 170 N. E. 637 (1930).
40 44 Ohio St. 12, 4 N. E. 236 (1886).
41 276 U. S. 28 (1928).
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the wages of Linstead and his crew, or that they could only
be discharged or suspended by the Big Four, prevented
their being the servants of the Chesapeake & Ohio Company
for the performance of this particular job.4 2
The Court differentiated the Linstead case from Hull v.
Philadelphia & R. Ry.43 In that case, Hull, the plaintiff's de-
ceased, was employed by the Western Maryland Company as a
brakeman. Although the accident occurred on the tracks of the
Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, the Court held that
Hull was still in the employ of the Western Maryland Railway
Company because his work was the work of the Western Mary-
land Railway Company. Even though it was carried on for a
part of the way over the rails of the Philadelphia & Reading
Railway, the loads were being carried for the Western Mary-
land Railway Company, and presumably the rates which were
received for the transportation were the receipts of the Western
Maryland Railway Company.44
G. If the Precedent Is Based upon a Rule, Does That Rule Still
Exist or Was It Changed, Altered or Repealed?
In John C. Byrnes v. The New York, New Haven, and Hart-
ford Railroad Company, in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York (File No. 12397), plaintiff al-
leged that as an employee of the defendant he was injured while
assisting in loading United States mail from a handtruck into a
mail car. The action was predicated under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act.
The defendant contended that at the time of the accident
plaintiff was not in the employ of the railroad company. The
question, therefore, was whether the railroad company was im-
mune from liability under the "lent-servant" or "ad hoc" doc-
trine announced in Denton v. Yazoo M. v. R. R. 4 5 At the time
Denton was injured, the Regulations of the Postmaster General
provided:
Railroad companies shall furnish the men necessary to
handle the mails, to load them into and receive them from
the doors of the railway post office cars, and to load and
pile the mails in and unload them from storage and baggage
42 Id. at 34.
43 252 U. S. 475 (1920).
44 Supra note 42 at 35.
45 284 U. S. 305 (1931).
Jan., 1964
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cars, under the direction of the transfer clerk, or clerk in
charge of the car, if one is on duty, except as provided in
Section 1290. Mails intended for delivery to postal clerk
shall never be placed in a postal car unless there is a clerk
on duty to receive and care for them.46
The Court, in deciding the statutory obligation imposed upon
the railroad company in the Denton case, held that:
The statutory obligation imposed upon the railroad car-
riers is simply to transport mail offered for transportation
by the United States. They are not required to handle, load
or receive mail matter, but only to furnish the men neces-
sary for those purposes.47
Under the provisions of the above Postmaster's rule, the
Denton case was decided correctly. However, when the cause of
Byrnes was filed, the Postmaster General, under Rule No. 39
C. F. R. 92.36, Postal Service Duties of Railroad Companies,
changed the former rule to read:
(b) Necessary help to be furnished by railroad. Rail-
road companies shall furnish the men necessary to handle
the mails, to load and pile the mails in and unload them from
storage and baggage cars, except as provided in Section 92.43.
One can readily appreciate and distinguish from the change
of the rules that the doctrine laid down in the Denton case was
no longer applicable. The Postmaster undoubtedly had in mind
the decision of the Court in Denton when he deleted the phrase,
"under the direction of the transfer clerk, or clerk in charge of
the car, if one is on duty." His further intent to change the rule
of the Denton case is manifested by the modification of Rule 39
C. F. R. 92.41 by 39 F. R. 92.77:
Railroad employees handling mails regarded as agents of
railroad: At places where railroad companies are required
to take mails from and deliver them into post offices or postal
stations or to transfer them to connecting railroads, the per-
sons employed to perform such services shall be regarded
as agents of the companies and not employees of the postal
service, and need not be sworn; but such persons shall be
more than 16 years of age and of suitable intelligence and
character. Postmasters shall promptly report any violation
of this requirement to the Post Office Department.
The investigation by the advocate, in discovering the change
in the rule, produced a complete reversal of the reasoning in the
46 Id. at 307.
47 Supra note 46 at 309-10.
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Denton case and was sufficient in character for the defendant
railroad to drop the subterfuge of its defense. This produced a
settlement commensurate with the total and permanent injury
sustained by Byrnes.
H. Inherent Power to Decide and Determine the Common-Law
Doctrine
In the case of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,4 the Supreme Court
of the United States upset the Tyson case, 49 which was a prece-
dent in force for more than seventy-five years. The Erie case
established that the federal courts do not have an inherent power
of common law and that each state, through its statutory law
and decisions handed down by the highest tribunal of the state,
has the sole right of determination of common-law rights.
In federal courts, except in matters governed by the Fed-
eral Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the state.5 0 The phrase "laws of the
several states," includes not only statutory law, but also court
decisions.
Many states, for example, recently have changed the old im-
munity rule concerning negligence suits against hospitals, now
holding that it is not fair to deny compensation on the ground
that the hospital is immune from tort action."' Obviously, then,
the applicability of state law is most important.
Felix Frankfurter wrote an article on stare decisis5 2 in which
he spoke on the Court's observance of stare decisis in denying
acceptance of modified working laws for women. He contended
that courts must make allowances by reducing the working hours
for women.
He said, in effect, that if the Court recognized the need to
protect women, it could well destroy the basic reasoning of its
prior judicial decisions. Therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis
has no legitimate application to constitutional decisions where
48 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
49 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
50 28 U.S.C.A. 1652.
51 Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E.
287 (1922), illustrates the old view. As to the new view see 2 Encyc. of
Negligence, Sec. 321 (1962).
52 Frankfurter, The Present Approach to Constitutional Decisions on the
Bill of Rights, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 790 (1914-15).
Jan., 1964
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the Court is presented with a new body of knowledge, largely
non-existent at the time of its prior decision.
Frankfurter again said that this was precisely the situation
in People v. Charles Schweinler Press.53 In this case, the New
York court overruled People v. Williams,54 and sustained a
statute prohibiting night work for women. Frankfurter stated
that during the seven years which had elapsed between the two
cases, an overwhelming mass of authoritative data was developed
which demanded a departure from stare decisis.
Conclusion
This writer believes that once a court of authoritative juris-
diction has thoroughly considered a given question and has an-
nounced a decision which appeals to reason, the res adjudicata
so pronounced should be followed. But one must remember that
a decided case is worth only as much as it weighs in reason and
righteousness, and no more. As Justice Wanamaker stated:
It must prove its right to control in any given situation
by the degree in which it supports the rights of a party vio-
lated and serves the cause of justice as to all parties con-
cerned.55
The importance of vigilance is illustrated in the case of Bier-
macher v. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. R.56 (Nickel Plate Road). When
this case was first submitted to a jury in 1910 in the Court of
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the Supreme Court
of the United States had not yet decided whether the Federal
Employers' Liability Act covered res ipsa loquitur cases. The
plaintiff obtained a verdict, and the Supreme Court of Ohio re-
versed the decision. Thereafter, the cause was again assigned to
a trial judge, who entertained a motion to dismiss on the ground
that neither the pleadings nor the opening statements of counsel
presented sufficient facts to establish a cause of action. The Court
of Appeals thereafter reversed, and the case proceeded to trial
for a third time. The verdict in favor of the plaintiff for a sub-
stantially lesser amount was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
53 214 N. Y. 395, 108 N. E. 639 (1915).
54 189 N. Y. 131, 81 N. E. 778 (1907).
55 Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 352, 126 N. E. 300, 301
(1919).
56 110 Ohio St. 173, 143 N. E. 570 (1924); 114 Ohio St. 554, 151 N. E. 665
(1926); 22 Ohio App. 104, 153 N. E. 525 (1925); (Ohio Ct. App.) 162 N. E. 720;
(mem. 278 U. S. 614, cert. den. (1928)).
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Ohio, and in the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Marshall,
the real gist of the reasons for reversal in the first instance be-
came known.
The Chief Justice stated that if the Supreme Court had
known that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied to master-
servant cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the
court originally would never have reversed the judgment. Like-
wise, discussing federal cases in his concurring opinion, he fur-
ther said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does apply to
F. E. L. A. master-servant cases.
The Supreme Court of the United States has finally laid to
rest any uncertainty on this score by holding that the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine is applicable to all causes arising from the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act.57
The concepts and changes in existing precedents, illustrated
by the selected cases cited herein, convey the importance of
examining the law and the facts in every individual instance.
Every jurist, advocate and brief writer must be certain that
metamorphosis has not changed stare decisis, before abandoning
his search or resigning himself to the quoted precedent.
57 Johnson v. U. S., 333 U. S. 452 (1947); see also, Carpenter v. Baltimore &
0. R.R., 109 F. 2d 375 (6th Cir. 1940); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Smith, 42 F.
2d 111 (6th Cir. 1930), cert. den. 282 U. S. 856 (1930); Cochran v. Pittsburgh
& L. E. R.R., 31 F. 2d 769 (N. D. Ohio 1923); Jesionowski v. Boston & M. R.R.,
329 U. S. 452 (1947).
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